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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS
/

JULIA V. WHETMAN,
/

Plaintiff/Appellee,
/

vs.
/

JOHN D. WHETMAN,

Case No.

970642CA

/

Defendant/Appellant.

JURISDICTION
The Court of Appeals has jurisdiction in this matter
pursuant to Utah Code Annotated § 78-2a-3(2)(h).

This is an

appeal from a final judgment of the Second Judicial District
Court over which the Court of Appeals has original appellate
jurisdiction.
STATEMENT OF THE CASE, NATURE OF THE PROCEEDING
This is an appeal from a final Judgment and Decree of
Divorce from the Second Judicial District Court for the State of
Utah, Davis County, Farmington Department.
On May 6, 1997, a bench trial was held before JUDGE
GLEN R. DAWSON upon a Complaint for divorce.

A follow-up hearing

on Defendant's objection to the Decree was held on July 31, 1997,
and a subsequent hearing was held on October 1, 1997, regarding
the Defendant's objection to the form of the Decree.
The Decree of Divorce became final on October 1, 1997,
in spite of the fact that the trial was concluded on May 6, 1997,
1

due to the fact that the parties had discrepancies as to the form
of the final order.

JUDGE DAWSON stated that for purpose of

appeal, the Decree of Divorce would become final on October 1,
1997.
The Defendant, JOHN D. WHETMAN, mailed a notice of
appeal on October 30, 1997, and filed with the Court on October
31, 1997.
On November 6, 1997, the Defendant mailed a motion to
stay the lower court order to sell the subject marital residence.
The Plaintiff objected to the Defendant's motion to stay the
proceedings and a hearing was held on the Defendant's motion on
Monday, December 22, 1997.

Pursuant to the hearing, the

Defendant's motion to stay the sale of the home was granted by
the trial court.

On December 31, 1997, Plaintiff filed a motion

for summary disposition with the Utah Court of Appeals.

On April

13, 1998, the Court of Appeals denied the Plaintiff's motion for
summary disposition.

On May 12, 1998, the Defendant filed a

motion for extension of time to file the appellant's brief which
was granted on May 14, 1998.

This case now comes before the

Utah Court of Appeals on the Appellant's brief.
STATEMENT OF ISSUES PRESENTED FOR REVIEW
The Appellant, Mr. WHETMAN, contends that the trial
court abused its discretion in its division of the marital
assets. In this case, the Defendant came into the marriage with
$97,000.00 in pre-marital assets compared to $35,000.00 in premarital assets brought into the marriage by the Plaintiff.
2

It is

undisputed that the Defendant had $62,000.00 more of
contributions to the marriage than did the Plaintiff. The issue
in the case at hand is whether or not the Defendant's Quit Claim
Deed to the Plaintiff of his pre-marital estate was given undue
weight by the trial court and whether the trial court adequately
considered the circumstances surrounding the transfer of Mr.
WHETMAN's pre-marital equity in his home by the Quit Claim Deed.
The parties7 marriage lasted a total of three years,
and the parties lived together only 20 of the 36 months of
marriage.

Also, whether the Court adequately considered the fact

that by dividing the assets as it did, Mr. WHETMAN's children
from his deceased wife, effectually lost their inheritance.
A.

The Standard of Appellate Review:

The trial court's decision concerning the division of
marital assets is reviewed under the abuse of discretion
standard.

Endrody v. Endrody, 914 P.2d 1166 (Utah App. 1996),

Shepherd v. Shepherd, 876 P.2d 429 (Utah App. 1994).
Pursuant to the case of Berger v. Berger, 713 P.2d 695
(Utah 1985), the Supreme Court stated that:
"although this case is equity and we are free
to review both the law and the facts, we
place the presumption of validity upon the
trial court's actions in divorce cases.
Thus, the burden is on the appellant to show
error, and we will overturn the trial court's
findings of fact only if they are contrary to
the clear preponderance of the evidence."
Berger at 697.
The Supreme Court in Berger further stated that:
"We will overturn the trial court's judgment
where there has been a misunderstanding or
3

misapplication of the law resulting in
substantial and prejudicial error or where
there has been such an abuse of discretion
that an inequity or injustice has resulted.
Berqer at 697, citing Fletcher v. Fletcher,
615 P.2d 1218 (Utah 1980).
B.

Citation to the record showing that the issue was

preserved in the trial court;
All of the issues presented in this appeal were argued
in the trial court.

The closing statement by Mr. WHETMAN's

attorney setting forth the issues discussed in this brief are set
forth at page 271 through page 279 of the transcript.
The Appellant contends that the trial court's decision
to divide the equity in the marital home equally, did not
adequately consider the factors relating to distribution of premarital property, recently considered in the case of Cox v. Cox,
877 P.2d 1262, 1269 (Utah App. 1994).

Those factors are: (1) the

duration of the parties marriage; (2) the amount of contribution
made by the Appellee to the. marital asset; (3) the intent of the
parties in signing the Quit Claim Deed; (4) whether the property
was acquired before or during the marriage; (5) what the parties
gave up by the marriage; (6) whether the assets were accumulated
or enhanced by the joint efforts of the parties.
DETERMINATIVE CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS
Article IV, Section 1. [Equal political rights]

The

rights of citizens of the State of Utah to vote and hold office
shall not be denied on abridged on the count of sex.
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Both male

and female citizens of this state shall enjoy equally all civil,
political, and religious rights and privileges, (Emphasis added).
The above constitutional right becomes applicable in
this case in light of § 30-2-1 of the Utah Code which states:
Wife's rights in property.
Real and personal estate of every female
acquired before marriage, and all property to
which she may afterwards become entitled by
purchase, gift, grant, inheritance, bequest
or devise, shall be and remain the estate and
property of such female, and shall not be
liable for the debts, obligations or
engagements or her husband, and may be
conveyed, devised, or bequeathed by her as if
she were unmarried.
The Appellant would argue that under Article IV,
Section 1 of the Utah Constitution, § 30-2-1 applies to males as
well.

Therefore, the Appellant will argue that the inheritance

which he and his daughters received from the estate of his
deceased wife, and the mother of this two daughters, should be
kept within his family and should not be diverted because of
divorce.

See, Mortensen v. Mortensen, 760 P.2d 304, 308 (Utah

1988); Izatt v. Izatt, 627 P.2d 49, 51-52 (Utah 1981).
STATEMENT OF FACTS
On May 6, 1997, a trial was
DAWSON upon a Complaint for divorce.

held before JUDGE GLEN R.
A follow up hearing on

Defendant's Objection to the Decree was held on July 31, 1997,
and a subsequent hearing was held on October 1, 1997.

At trial,

the Plaintiff was represented by Attorney TOM D. BRANCH, and the
Defendant was represented by Attorney DOUGLAS B. THOMAS.
5

The

Appellant, JOHN D. WHETMAN, was not represented by counsel at the
hearings on July 31, 1997 or on October 1, 1997, as his counsel,
DOUGLAS B. THOMAS, had withdrawn.
Pursuant to the trial, the Court granted the Appellee,
Mrs. WHETMAN, a Decree of Divorce based upon irreconcilable
differences.

The Plaintiff was awarded a judgment in the amount

of $53,235.50 as her share of the equity in the marital
residence. See Findings of fact at page 6.

Mr. WHETMAN was

awarded the residence subject to Plaintiff's judgment.

Mr.

WHETMAN was ordered to make immediate good faith efforts to
refinance the home and pay the judgment in a lump sum payment
payable to the Plaintiff and her attorney, TOM D. BRANCH, in the
amount of $20,000.00, due on or before the 1st day of September,
1997.

The balance of the judgment was to be paid on a monthly

basis for five years, with the first payment due October 1, 1997,
and the full balance of the judgment, together with interest at
the now present judgment interest rate to be paid in full, on or
before September 1, 2002.
A telephone conference was conducted by JUDGE DAWSON on
October 1, 1997.

Present by telephone were the Plaintiff, by and

through her attorney, TOM D. BRANCH, and Mr. WHETMAN appearing
pro se, his counsel DOUGLAS B. THOMAS having withdrawn.

Pursuant

to the telephone conference, the original Order of the Court was
amended, and the parties were ordered to make immediate and good
faith efforts to sell the subject marital residence, using a
listing agent selected by Mrs. WHETMAN.
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Mr. WHETMAN was ordered to provide the real estate
agent with a key to the home and to allow the agent to have
access to the home in completion of the agent's duties.

He

was

ordered to keep the home in show condition and to maintain the
outside and inside of the home and to have the home available for
showing at any time during reasonable hours.

Mr. WHETMAN was

allowed to stay in the home during its listing and was ordered to
keep the home obligations paid in full and timely.
The Court ordered that when the home sold, the parties
were to divide equally the equity received from the sale of the
home after payment of the first mortgage, the line of credit,
and all real estate commissions and other costs associated with
the sale of the home.
In its Findings of Fact, page 3 at paragraph 7, the
trial court found that Mrs. WHETMAN had pre-marital assets in the
approximate amount of $35,000.00, and Mr. WHETMAN had pre-marital
assets in the approximate amount of $97,000.00.
The Court found that the Plaintiff and Defendant were
husband and wife having been married on February 18, 1994.
The Court found that in June of 1995, Mr. WHETMAN
signed a Quit Claim Deed on the home from himself to the parties
equally as joint owners. Findings of Fact, page 4.
The Court further found in paragraph 7 of the Findings
of Fact that the parties mutually agreed to join together their
respective assets and to share those assets jointly and equally.
7

Mr. WHETMAN is appealing the Judge's division of the
equity in the marital home.
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT
At the time the parties married, Mr. WHETMAN had a home
valued at $290,000.00 with $97,000.00 of equity.

Mr. WHETMAN

built the home using proceeds he had inherited for himself and
for the benefit of his two daughters, from his deceased's wife's
insurance policy.
19, 1989.

His first wife died from cancer on December

Mr. WHETMAN testified that after being harassed, and

badgered for many months, and at a time when the parties had
separated several times, he succumbed to the pressure of his
second wife to

Quit Claim the Deed from his name alone to the

parties as joint tenants with full rights of survivorship to the
Appellee, JULIA WHETMAN.
At trial, both of the parties stated that their intent
in the transfer by Quit Claim Deed was not a gift, but was for
the benefit of Mr. WHETMAN's children from a prior marriage, and
the Appellee and her children, in the event that Mr. WHETMAN
died.
Since the marriage dissolved with Mr. WHETMAN very much
alive, the Appellant would argue that the anticipated purpose of
the Quit Claim Deed, as insurance for the children in the event
of his death, never occurred, therefore Mr. WHETMAN's pre-marital
inheritance for the benefit of himself and his children should
have been returned to him by the trial court rather than divided
as marital property.

8

ARGUMENT
POINT I
THE TRIAL COURT'S RECORD SHOWS THAT IT WAS
NOT THE INTENT OF EITHER PARTY TO GIFT THE
PRE-MARITAL EQUITY IN THE PLAINTIFF'S HOME
MRS. WHETMAN BY THE QUIT CLAIM DEED.
The parties were married on February 18, 19 94 ,

Time

of 1995, approximately 18 months after parties' marriage,
WHETMAN signed a Quit claim Deed to the home from himself as sole
owner to the parties as joint tenants, with full rights of
survivorship to Mrs. WHETMAN.
ml

marriage,

" :i t Claim Deed was signed on the 16th month of the
the parties separated permanently four months

later.
At

WHETMAN, test if i eel I ;hat there had been

substantial strain on the marriage, and the parties had already
separated at least two times before the Quit Claim Deed was
si gi led

Mr

WHETMAN testi £i ed regard i ng 1:1: le reasoi l w hy he si gned

the Quit Claim Deed:
It was just at her request to make her feel
more secure. She kept telling me that I'd
had so much death in my family that Leishman
luck said that something would probably
happen to m e . Her father had bankrupted or
something a couple of times, her brother had
died, my mother had died, my wife had died,
and that was her reasoning, and I believed
her. Transcript at 188.
WHETMAN further stated at trial:
She lead me to believe that she was having
that done so that a home would be provided
for her and my children in the event of my
death. Transcript at 188.
9

At trial, when asked if he had prepared the Quit Claim
Deed with the intent of gifting one-half interest in the property
to Mrs. WHETMAN, Mr. WHETMAN stated "I did not". Transcript at
186.
Mr. WHETMAN did not consult an attorney prior to
executing the Quit Claim Deed. Transcript at 189.

and Mrs.

WHETMAN never denied that she had in fact spoken with an attorney
prior to the time that she signed the Quit Claim Deed.

Mr.

WHETMAN stated at trial:
She told me after I had signed this, she
blurted out that her father, on the advise of
her father and an attorney, she was advised
to get herself on the Deed. Transcript at
190.
The tenor of Mrs. WHETMAN's argument at trial was that
Mr. WHETMAN had gifted her by Quit Claim Deed, a full right of
survivorship in the home which he had prior to the marriage,
including $97,000.00 worth of equity.

However, Mrs. WHETMAN and

her attorney were quick to deny that the Quit Claim Deed was
characterized as a gift.

During the trial, the following dialog

took place regarding the Quit Claim Deed;
Mr. Thomas: Mr. Whetman, coming back to the
gift, the nature of the gift that was taken
place, at least their claiming a gift, deed
is what I want to refer to.
Mr. Branch: Objection, your honor, we have
not made that claim.
The Court: I think their position has been
that the preparation of the Deed, the
recording of the Deed was part of an
agreement entered into during the marriage to
join all property (inaudible) person. I'm
10

probably the one that used the word "gift"
and I apologize.
Mr. Branch; And that could be a finding in
this Court, but I'm just saying that he is
mischaracterizing her testimony, she did not
call it a gift. Transcript at 221.
Mrs, WHETMAN, stated at trial that:
I figured I would be in charge of his girls
if something was to happen to him and I
wanted them to have a home, I didn't want
anybody out on the street. Transcript at 143.
M

-

WHETMAN stated at trial:

She lead me to believe that she was having
that done so that a home would be provided
for her and my children in the event of my
death. Transcript at 188.
I t :i s c] ear £x oil the testimony < >l both parties t hat I, lie
intent of Mr. WHETMAN's Quit Claim Deed was to provide for his
children and, if he were still married at the time of his death,
for Mr s , WHETMAN ai i ::i I: n = it: < : 1 :i i ] cii: en,

Si i ice the par ties d :i vorced

and it did not become necessary for Mrs. WHETMAN to care for Mr.
WHETMAN's children, the original purpose for signing the Quit
Claim Deed, never occuri. ed ,
Although Mr. BRANCH, Mrs. WHETMAN's attorney, was quick
to point out at the trial that Mrs. WHETMAN never claimed that
the Quit

n " 1 a J mi Ht'cil n r

i ifil! , I he trial ::: ourt's ruling in

effect gave the Quit Claim Deed the legal characterization of a
gift.

The evidence indicates that the parties' intent was to
ne event of Mi

WHETMZ

death.

Because Mr. WHETMAN's death did not occur prior to the parties'

11

divorce, the court, in equity, should have returned Mr. WHETMAN'S
pre-marital equity to him as part of the divorce settlement.
POINT II
THE TRIAL COURT SHOULD HAVE ATTEMPTED TO
RESTORE THE PARTIES TO THEIR PRE-MARITAL
STATUS.
This case is similar to the case of Cox v. Cox, 877
P.2d 1262.

In the Cox case, the Utah Court of Appeals held that

where the husband had owned the house for many years before the
marriage, and he had raised his nine children in the house, a
distribution to the wife of one-half its value would not be
equitable.
This court in Cox indicated that under certain
circumstances, the Court may properly attempt to restore the
parties to their pre-marital status. The decision reads;
Where the marriage is of short duration,
where no children were born, and where the
couple was married later in life, a trial
court may properly attempt to restore the
parties to their pre-marital status. Cox at
1269.
The trial court in the case at hand did not attempt to
restore the parties to their pre-marital status in spite of the
fact that the factors set forth in Cox were present in this case.
Those factors are: (a) this was not a first marriage for either
party; (b) the marriage was of short duration; (c) Mr. WHETMAN
and his two children from a previous marriage had lived in the
house prior to his second marriage, and substantial equity
existed in the home prior to the marriage; (d) a distribution to
12

the wife of one-half the value would require him to sell the
home; and (

^ual division of the home's equity would give

the wife a disproportionate return considering her lack of
contribution

the equity in the home.
POINT III

AS A GENERAL RULE, PRE-MARITAL PROPERTY,
INCLUDING GIFTS AND INHERITANCES, IS VIEWED
AS SEPARATE PROPERTY.
Generally, real and personal property owned by either
party prioi l.n l.L

marrie

inheritance, as «>•.

-. -

- '

gixt or

;,;; the increase on Lru property after

marriage remains the separate property of the party. Utah Const.
art

I'7

§ 3

See a 1 so § 30-2-] of I: .1 i< • \ IJtal Code.'

In the case of Mortensen v. Mortensen, 760 P.2d 304,
the Supreme Court of Utah stated:
We conclude that in utah, trial courts making
"equitable" property division pursuant to §
30-3-5 should in accordance with the rule
prevailing in most other jurisdictions and
with the division made in many of our own
cases, generally award property acquired by
one spouse by gift and inheritance during the
marriage (or property acquired in exchange
thereof) to that spouse, together with any
appreciation or enhancement of its value,
unless (1) the other spouse of his or her
efforts or expense, contributed to the
enhancement, maintenance, or protection of
that property, thereby acquiring an equitable
interest in it, Dubois v. Dubois, 504 P.2d
1380 (1973), supra, or (2) the property has
been consumed or its identity lost through
commingling or exchanges or where the
acquiring spouse has made a gift of the
interest therein to the other spouse. Cf.
Jesperson v. Jesperson, 610 P.2d 326 (Utah
1980) .
13

The court in Mortensen further elaborated;
However, in making that division, the donee
and their spouse should not lose the benefit
of his or her gift or inheritance by the
trial courts automatically or arbitrarily
awarding the other spouse an equal amount of
the remaining property which was acquired by
their joint efforts to off-set the gifts or
inheritance,... These rules will preserve and
give effect to the right that married persons
have always had in this state to separately
own and enjoy property. It also accords with
the normal intent of donors or deceased
persons that their gifts and inheritances
should be kept within their family and
succession should not be diverted because of
divorce. (Emphasis added). Mortensen at 308309. See also Burke v. Burke, 733 P.2d 133
(Utah 1987); Naranio v. Naranio, 751 P.2d
1144 (Utah App. 1988) .
POINT IV
MRS. WHETMAN'S CONTRIBUTION TO THE MARRIAGE
DID NOT JUSTIFY THE TRIAL COURT'S EQUAL
DIVISION OF THE EQUITY IN MR. WHETMAN'S HOME.
In the case of Jesperson v. Jesperson, 610 P.2d 326
(Utah, 1980), the Utah Supreme Court stated:
In making a property division, a court may
properly consider such things as the length
of the marriage and parties' respective
contributions of the marriage. This marriage
lasted less than six years, and no children
issued therefrom.... It was not unreasonable
for the court to permit plaintiff to withdraw
from the marital property the equivalent of
those assets plaintiff brought into the
marriage. Jesperson at 328.
In the case at hand, the marriage was of short
duration, a total of 36 months, of which, the parties lived
together for only 20 months.

No children were born as issue of

this marriage, and this was the second marriage for each of the
14

parties, both parties having children from prior marriages.

When

the parties married, M r . WHETMAN had a home valued by the trial
court at $290,000.00. (Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law at
page 5, paragraph 1 4 ) . The trial court found that when the
parties married, the Plaintiff had pre-marital assets in the
approximate amount of $35,000.00 and the Defendant had p r e marital assets in the approximate amount of $97,000.00.
In its findir,

le trial cotin t stated:

...the Defendant intended the Quit Claim Deed
to have legal consequences in that he
expressed that he wanted to make sure that
his wife and all of the children were taken
care of at his death. (Findings of Fact at
page 4)
It is c IL'III tnitii I In.1 I'1 i nd.i nq;;i of Pdot m I (" nic 1 u,.i i ui«:;
of Law that the trial court recognized that the Quit Claim Deed
wa_ -,_~ *•*• '•«;

as an out-right gift from M r . WHETMAN to M r s .
r

WHETMAN

dividing the equity in the home on an equal

b a s i s , the court treated the Quit Claim Deed as if it were a
gift.
i11.!!

Il I Hi

c v u I e i K j e pi e s e n l e c i by

IniLh p d i t i e s

suppuits

the conclusion that the Quit Claim Deed was essentially made as a
"poor man's will" which would have the effect that, in the event
of

Mi:

WHETMAN'

IIIMIII,

In i , i - l n l d r t ' i

wnulUl

h.ive

i (ilai.ii1

I

live,

assuming that at the time of his death, he were still married,
and that M r s . WHETMAN would also take care of M r . WHETMAN's
children,, from hi s previous marriage

owever, F

I

not d ie, arid it never became necessary for M r s . WHETMAN to care
for M r . WHETMAN's children from his previous marriage.
15

Therefore, the original intent of the Quit Claim Deed was never
realized prior to the parties' divorce.

In light of the fact

that Mrs. WHETMAN never claimed that this was a gift, equity
mandates that the trial court to the extent possible, return the
parties to their pre-marital status.
Regarding the contribution of Mrs. WHETMAN aside from
the property which she brought into the marriage, Mrs. WHETMAN
did not ~work during the parties marriage to any significant
degree and in fact, when asked by the Defendant to possibly
obtain employment to help the parties due to some financial setbacks, Mr. WHETMAN testified that Mrs. WHETMAN stated many times
"If I have to go back to work, there is no reason to be married."
Transcript at 222-223.
Apparently, the trial court placed an inordinate amount
of weight on the Quit Claim Deed in light of the fact that
neither of the parties ever alleged that the Quit Claim Deed was
a gift.

The trial court had ample opportunity to award the

parties their pre-marital assets and divide any remaining
property on an equitable basis. The court even acknowledged that
the Quit Claim Deed was "strange", and further that "the evidence
appears to show me that there was an agreement to work together,
to join forces."

Transcript at 273.

By the court's own

statement, it has recognized that the purpose of the Quit Claim
Deed was to join forces to make a stronger marriage.

However,

when the marriage was terminated, the purpose of "joining forces"
was no longer necessary and the court should have un-done the
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effect of t h e Quit Claim Deed and returned the parties t o their
pre -mar it a ] s I: a t u s.
In t h e case of Hogue v. Hogue, 831 P.2d 120 (Utah A p p .
1 9 9 2 ) , this court upheld a trial court's ruling that awarded M r .
Hogue

,-.- -

• aalf interest ..:

Rogue's pi: e-marital

property in spite of the fact that "'.- Jul. of 1982, M r . and M r s .
Hogue jointly agreed that M r . Hogue would convey b^ Quit Claim
Deed, sole ownership of the ranch to M r s . Hogue as a means of
protecting t h e property from M r . Hogue's judgment creditors."
Hogue at 1 2 1 .
It is clear that the trial court in this case w a s not
compelled to honor the Quit Claim Deed, but had the equitable
power to return the home to M r . WHETMAN.
The Supreme Court of Utah in the case of Georgedes v .
G e o r g e d e s , 627 P.2d ,•*, the court held that there w a s no abuse of
discJ - * .

title to the home = i id bi is:i ness to t:l: le

husband w h e r e , shortly after the inception of the p a r t i e s ' seven
year m a r r i a g e , the husband had put title in the home and business
j n j • ::> :i in t t e n a i:i c y w :i I: h h :i s i \?r :i f e

T I: I e e f f e c t o f t h e d e c i s i o i :i i n

Georgedes was to restore each party the property he or she had
brought into the marriage, which gave the Plaintiff, Mr.
Georgedes, the home • 11111 business.
In the case of Newmeyer v. Newmeyer, 745 P.2d 127 6
(Utah 1987), the Utah Supreme Court held that it was not an abuse
i J I" 11 L s e r e 1 J r HI In mi Mir I i J J I r o u i t

In c r e d i t t h e wi f e wi t h

i n h e r i t a n c e s s h e u s e d t o p u r c h a s e homes e a r l y i n t h e
17

parties

twenty year marriage. The case at hand is much more clear. The
equity was present in the home prior to the parties' marriage,
and the marriage was of very short duration.
CONCLUSION
There is ample evidence to suggest that the Quit Claim
Deed from Mr. WHETMAN to Mrs. WHETMAN was not intended as a gift,
but was an effort by the parties to make sure that Mr. WHETMAN's
two girls from his previous wife were taken care of in the event
of his death.

The parties divorce terminated the need for the

Quit Claim Deed, and the trial court should have, to the extent
possible, returned the parties to their pre-marital status, in
light of the fact that this was a marriage of short duration, the
parties had no children between them, it was a second marriage
for each of the parties, and there was no intent by Mr. WHETMAN
to gift his inheritance and the inheritance of his two girls to
Mrs. WHETMAN.
ADDENDUM
Attached.
DATED this

jtf^

day of June, 1998.

G. SCO?T JEfiSEN
Attorney, for Defendant/Appellant

18

CERTIFICATE OF MAILING
I hereby certify that I mailed a true and correct copy
of the above and foregoing Brief of Appellant to the following,
postage prepaid this ___^
day of June, 1998:
Tom D. Branch
Attorney for Plaintiff/Appellee
5300 South 360 West, Suite 360
Salt Lake City, UT 84123

T
G. SCOTT JENSEN
Attorney for Defendant/Appellant

19

ADDENDUM

Addendum A
Findings of Fact and Conclusions

of Law

TOM D. BRANCH (3997)
Attorney for Plaintiff
5300 South 360 West, Suite 360
Salt Lake City, Utah 84123
Telephone: (801) 262-1500

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT
IN AND FOR DAVIS COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH
JULIA L. WHETMAN
Plaintiff,
vs.

JOHN D. WHETMAN,
Defendant.

])
)
;

FINDINGS OF FACT AND
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW

]i

Civil No. 964701115

]i

JUDGE MICHAEL G. ALLPHIN

]

This matter came on for Evidentiary Trial before Judge Dawson
on May 6, 1997. A follow up hearing on Defendant's Objections to
the Decree was held on July 13, 1997.

Both parties appeared in

person together with their respective counsel, Tom D. Branch for
the Plaintiff and Douglas B. Thomas for the Defendant.

Following

the trial in the matter, the Court made the following Findings of
Fact and Conclusions of Law:

1

FINDINGS OF FACT
1.

The parties, in January of 1997, entered into a

Stipulation which was memorialized in a Pre-Trial Order signed and
entered by this Court on January 16, 1997 by Judge Allphin.

The

terms of that Pre-Trial Order are incorporated herein and are
effective as of the date of that Order and are binding on the
parties.
2.
State

of

Plaintiff was a bona fide resident of Davis County,

Utah,

for

more

than

three

months

preceding

the

commencement of this action. This Court has jurisdiction and venue
is proper.
3.

Plaintiff and Defendant are husband and wife having

been married on February 18, 1994.
4.

The

Plaintiff

has

marriage, ages 18, 17, 15 and 9.

four

children

from

a prior

The Defendant has two children

from a prior marriage, ages 12 and 8.

There are no children born

as issue of this marriage.
5.

The parties separated, following marital disputes

that culminated and became more severe, on June 23, 1996, and have
remained separated since that time.

During the course of the

marriage, the parties developed irreconcilable differences making
the continuation of their marriage impractical and against both
their desires. The Court finds reasonable grounds for granting the
2

Plaintiff a divorce based upon those irreconcilable differences.
A Decree of Divorce should be granted to the Plaintiff on the
grounds of irreconcilable differences.
6.

A Decree of Divorce should become final upon entry.

7.

At the time the parties married, the Plaintiff had

pre-marital assets in the approximate amount of $35,000.00, and the
Defendant had pre-martial assets in the approximate amount of
$97,000.00.

The parties mutually agreed to join together their

respective assets and to share those assets jointly and equally.
Both parties agreed to provide all of their energies, assets, and
efforts to join their two families together as one and to raise the
children.
8.

Consistent with that agreement, the parties did join

their assets together.
marriage.

The Plaintiff gave all she had to this

The Plaintiff left her home, job, and much of her

furnishings to enter into this marriage, joined all of her premarital property into the joint benefit of the parties, and became
the primary care taker of all of the children, as was consistent
with the desire of both parties.
9.

The Defendant also joined his assets into this

marriage with the intent to share them equally with the Plaintiff.
10.

The parties took up residence in the Defendants pre-

marital home which had substantial pre-marital equity at the time.
3

However, in June of 1995, and consistent with the parties agreement
to join assets, the Defendant signed a Quit Claim Deed on the home
from himself to the parties equally, as joint owners. This action
by the Defendant was consistent with the parties actions in joining
all of

their

assets

into marital property, and this

action

transferred the home into marital property.
11.

The Defendant signed the Quit Claim Deed without

coercion, force, fraud, mistake, nor under any circumstance or for
any reason that would make it void, voidable or unenforceable. No
public policy was violated by the Defendant signing the Deed. The
Court finds the Defendant could have refused to sign the Quit Claim
Deed but did not. The Court finds that the Defendant executed the
Deed to further the parties agreement as indicated herein and for
no other reason that would cause this Court under case law to not
enforce the legal impact of the Deed.
12.

The Court finds that the Defendant intended the Quit

Claim Deed to have legal consequence and that he expressed that he
wanted to make sure that his wife and all of the children were
taken care of at his death.
knowingly and intelligently.

The Defendant signed the Deed
The Defendant intentionally signed

the Deed after having read it, requested it be prepared, and
knowing full well its legal consequences.

4

There was adequate

consideration for the Deed.

The Defendant asked that the Deed be

recorded and the Deed was recorded.
13.

The Court is not convinced that there are any facts

in this case that would justify a division of the equity in the
marital residence in any other percentage than equally. The Court
reviewed case law submitted by the parties, conducted its own
research, and is aware of the Court's discretion to award an
unequal division of property or to disregard legal title of a
marital asset, but finds no facts consistent with the case law that
would justify anything other than an equal split of the marital
residence equity.
14.

The Court finds that the fair market value of the

residence is $290,000.00. The Court reviewed the testimony of the
expert appraisers and all other persons testifying concerning the
value and finds that equity requires that the value be set as
indicated.
15.

The Court finds there is a first mortgage in the

amount of $162,574.00 and a line of credit in a second secured
position against the home in the amount of $20,955.00. The Court
has deducted and not given credit for the $1,000.00 on the line of
credit taken out by the Defendant after separation.
16.

The Court finds that the equity to be divided in the

home is $106,471.00 and that the equity should be divided equally
5

and that the Plaintiff should therefore be entitled to payment from
the Defendant for her share of the equity in the martial residence
the amount of $53,235.50. The Defendant should be awarded the home
subject to this obligation.
17.

The Plaintiff should be awarded a Judgment in the

amount of the equity in the marital residence.
awarded

the residence

subject to Plaintiff's

The Defendant is
judgment.

The

Defendant should make immediate good faith effort to refinance and
should pay the Judgment as follows: A lump sum payment payable to
Plaintiff and her attorney, Tom D. Branch, in the amount of
$20,000.00 due on or before the 1st day September, 1997.

The

balance of the Judgment should be paid on a monthly basis, for the
first five (5) years with the first payment due October 1, 1997,
and the full balance of the Judgment, together with interest at the
now present Judgment interest rate, to be paid in full on or before
September 1, 2002.

The monthly payments between September 1, 1997

and September 1, 2002 should be calculated using the balance of the
judgment owed after the down payment of $20,000.00 amortized over
10 years. The Court will hold a telephone conference on September
2, 1997 at 8:30 a.m. to discuss the status of the refinance
efforts.
18.

The Court further finds that the Corolla automobile

in question herein should be awarded to the Defendant who will be
6

responsible for all costs and debt related to that vehicle.

The

Defendant should hold harmless the Plaintiff on the Corolla debt.
The Plaintiff should have deducted $1,500.00 from her judgment on
the home equity as set forth above as a contribution for her share
of the Corolla debt. If there have been any double payments as the
parties testified to concerning the Corolla lease payments, the
Defendant shall be entitled to the credit for those overpayments.

19.

Each party will be responsible to cooperate in the

effectuation of this Courts ruling and in signing any and all
documents necessary to put into place the effect of the Court's
ruling.
20.

Concerning the parties dispute on personal property,

the parties are awarded the following:

TO THE PLAINTIFF
a.

All

items

in

paragraph

2

of

Plaintiff's

Exhibit 4 including subparagraphs a through t.
b.

All items in Defendant's Exhibit 8 under title

"Items to Julia" numbers 1 through 10
TO THE DEFENDANT
a.

All items set forth in Defendant's Exhibit 8

under "Items to John" numbers 1 through 7.
7

b.

All other items currently in the home not

otherwise specifically awarded to the Plaintiff
herein.
21.
immediately

The

make

Court

finds

available

the

Plaintiff for her pick up.

that

the

personal

Defendant

property

should

awarded

to

The Plaintiff should be allowed to

package and remove her own property items.
22.

Neither party is awarded attorney's fees and each

are responsible to pay their own fees and costs in this matter.
The Court finds that both of the attorney's fees were reasonable
and necessarily incurred, but in light of equitable discretion, the
Court finds considering the division of property set forth herein
that each party should pay their own attorney's fees.
23.

The Court finds that the Plaintiff has a gross

income of $1,300.00 per month and the Defendant has a gross income
of $3,300.00 per month.
parties

and

took those

The Court reviewed the expenses of both
into consideration

in its ruling on

attorney's fees.
24.

The Plaintiff should be awarded one half of the

stock account in the amount $1,150.00.

If the account was in

existence on November 19, 1996, Defendant should pay immediately
the $1,150.00 to Plaintiff.

If the account was sold prior to

November 19, 1996 as represented by Defendant the Plaintiff should
8

be entitled to a Judgment for the $1,150.00 payable as an addition
to the Judgment previously granted for Plaintiff's share of the
home equity, and on the same terms.
25.

On the foregoing Findings of Fact, the Court now

makes and enters the following:

CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
1.

The Court has jurisdiction over the parties and this

2.

The Plaintiff should be awarded a Decree of Divorce

action.

to become txnal upon entry.
3.
Findings

The Decree of Divorce

should conform to these

and to- the parties Pre-Trial Crder which the Court

specifically approves and incorporates herein as of its own date.

Dated this _!

day of-August, 1997.
BY THE COURT:

iU'i'KUVJClD AS

TU

rUKM.:

9

DOUGLAS B. THOMAS
Attorney for Defendant

10

CERTIFICATE OF MAILING
Rule 4-504 Notice
You and each of you, please take notice that pursuant to Rule
4-504, Code Judicial Administration, a copy of the foregoing
document has been mailed to each of you in accordance with the
Certificate of Mailing.
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW

This proposed FINDINGS OF FACT AND

will be signed and entered by the Court unless

objected to within five (5) days of service of this document upon
you.

Any objections must be filed prior to that time.

Dated this /r^day of August, 1997.

TOftD. BRANCH
Attorney for Plaintiff

11

CERTIFICATE OF MAILING

I, hereby certify that I mailed the foregoing document on
this

Q7±-day of August,

1997 to:

Douglas B. Thomas
GRIDLEY, WARD, HAVAS, SHAW & THOMAS
635 25th Street
Ogden, Utah 84401

rXKJ^>
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143
1

put my name on the quitclaim it", or something.

2

Q

What would he say when you would ask him those

3

questions?

4

A

He'd say we'd get to it, that he intended to do it,

5

always did intend to do it, that it was my house and there

6

was no problem.

7

I figured I would be in charge of his girls if something was

8

to happen to him and I wanted them to have a home, I didn't

9

want anybody out on the street.

And I did voice the concern of death because

10

Q

Okay.

And I assume he wanted the same thing?

11

A

I'm assuming, yeah.

He said that it would be taken

12

care of and that everything would be taken care of, to trust

13

him.

14

Q

All right.

He never said anything to the effect

15

that, "No, I'm not going to deed this house to you, that's

16

not the understanding?"

17

A

No, no, never.

18

Q

He always gave you affirmative responses?

19

A

Yes, I always had the impression that he was more

20
21

than happy to include me in sharing his home.
Q

In June of 1995, there was a quitclaim deed signed

22

by Mr. Whetman, recorded by Mr. Whetman's request, that

23

deeded the legal ownership of that home from him to both of

24

you, do you remember that?

25

A

Yes, I do.

144
1
2

Q

And I don't know if you have that exhibit in front

of you or not.

3

A

I don't.

4

Q

Let me show you just a copy of the quitclaim deed.

5

A

Okay.

6

Q

Until we can put our finger on the original, is

7

that a copy of the quitclaim deed that you understood was

8

signed in June of 1995?

9

A

Yes.

10

Q

Tell us why we finally got to the point that a deed

11
12

was signed, what happened?
A

We were discussing turning the Questar stock over

13

into the Charles Schwab account because it was a joint

14

account and the certificate thus far was in my name.

15

said, "Well, when we turn this over to the joint account, why

16

don't we take care of everything at once at get the home

17

deeded to both of us and put this in the Charles Schwab

18

account and that way everything will be jointly owned."

And I

19

Q

Everything would be done--

20

A

Everything would be done and basically everything

21

would be taken care of that we'd discussed previously.

22

Q

All right, and did, what did John say when you said

24

A

He said, "Fine, call Gretchen and let's get it

25

done."

23

that?

145

2 I

Q

Now, who's Gretchen?

A

Gretchen is somebody that I now of through the

3

mortgage company, she's a title officer and John also knows

4

her and so we felt comfortable going to her because we knew

5

her.

6

Q

So you instructed her to prepare that deed?

7

A

Uh-huh, yes.

8

Q

And did John talk to her?

9

A

John talked to her the day we went in to sign it.

10

Q

Do you remember what was discussed when you went in

11

to sign it?

12

A

There was really no discussion, it was a lot of

13

just, "Hi, how are you, and here's the deed", and she

14

explained it to both of us.

15

Q

What did she say?

16

A

She said that if either one of us was to die that

17

the house would go into that, it's a joint ownership so if

18

somebody dies then the house turns over to that one person.

19

Q

As a survivor?

20

A

As a survivor.

21

there.

22

Q

23

Did she describe anything about the present

ownership of the home once that was recorded?

24
25

The survivorship is typed right in

A
it.

Yeah, she said that both of us would jointly own

Addendum D
Trial Transcript page 186 through 190

186
1

A

That is.

2

Q

Okay.

3
4

MR. THOMAS:

No. 2 as illustrative of testimony.

5

MR. BRANCH:

6

THE COURT:

7

Same objections, Your Honor.
All right, and I'll note the objection

and receive Exhibit, Defendant's Exhibit 2.

8
9

We'd move for the admission of Exhibit

Q

BY MR. THOMAS:

All right.

Now, there's been

substantial discussion that has taken place thus far with

10

respect to the deed whereby the property was transferred in

11

your name solely into the name of you and your wife, and

12

you've had a chance to review that deed today in your prior

13

testimony, is that correct?

14

A

That's correct.

15

Q

All right.

Now, prior to signing that deed, I

16

believe your testimony earlier was that your wife hounded you

17

to sign the deed.

18

meant by that?

19
20

A

Could you please describe exactly what you

She just continually was after me to add her to the

deed and in the interest of marital peace I finally did.

21

Q

When you added her to the deed did you intend to

22

gift to her half of the interest of your property in the

23

home?

24

A

I did not.

25

Q

Where had you, that equity figure that we had

187
1

described at the time you went into the marriage from your

2

marital home, where had the proceeds come to get into that

3

first home?

4 !
5

A

All of that came from the proceeds of life

insurance from my wife's death.

6

Q

7

When your wife passed away, how much did she leave

in life insurance?
A

96,000.

Q

And what did you do with that

10

A

It went into the bank until the new home was built.

11

Q

And from the bank where did it go?

12

A

Into the construction of the new home, the lot.

13

Q

But essentially it was all--

14

A

Everything went into this new home.

15

Q

All right.

1

$96,000?

At the time you got married to the

16

plaintiff , did you have discussions as to whether or not that

17

home would become part of her property?

18

A

No, we did not.

19

Q

Did she ever indicate to you that she expected that

20

she would be an owner of that property and be entitled to a

21

half interest?

22

A

No, she did not.

23

Q

Did you ever have any discussions regarding any

24
25

intent that she would be a half owner in the property?
A

No.

1

188
1
2

Q

Okay, or a partial owner of the property for that

matter?

3

A

No.

4

Q

Why did you, other than the hounding, were there

5

any other reasons that influenced you to sign the quitclaim

6

deed?

7

A

It was just at her request to make her feel more

8

secure.

She kept telling me that I'd had so much death in my

9

family that Lieshman Luck said that something would probably

10

happen to me, her father had bankrupted or something a couple

11

of times, her brother had died, my mother had died, my wife

12

had died, and so that was her reasoning and I believed her.

13

Q

Was the--

14

A

She always told me that it's anything, everything

15
16

bad will happen from marrying her.
Q

And so specifically what was she trying to protect

17

against with respect to having the property transferred into

18

her name?

19

A

She led me to believe that she was having that done

20

so that a home would be provided for her and my children in

21

the event of my death.

22

Q

At the time you transferred that deed, did you

23

intend to give her a half interest in the property that had

24

been purchased with your wife's insurance proceeds?

25

MR. BRANCH:

Objection, Your Honor, under the

189
1

statute of frauds, (inaudible) evidence rule as well.

2

mean, the deed is unambiguous so testifying that it meant

3

something other than it does it against the rules of evidence

4

unless you can prove some ambiguity.

5
6

MR. THOMAS:

I

Your Honor, with respect, and I refer

you to the two cases that I cited to you this morning, the

—,- ?^ J LiL/

/ ; ?2J : ^
7

Jesperson case and the Georgettes, whatever it is case, both

8

of those cases clearly made it very clear that simply the

9

deed itself, a mere transfer itself, is not conclusive

10

evidence that there was intent of a gift to take place.

11

doesn't necessarily mean that a gift has taken place.

12

MR. BRANCH:

It

That's not the issue that he's trying

13

to put in.

14

intent of a document that is clear and the four corners of

15

that document unambiguous, there is no reason under Pearl

16

Evidence Rule that he should be able to any way set aside any

17
18

of that document.
THE COURT:

19

or not it was, he intended to make a gift, and he answered

20

that no.

21
22

Q

He's trying to change the legal effect or the

Well, you've already asked him whether

BY MR. THOMAS:

Prior to transferring the gift, did

you speak with an attorney?

23

A

No, I did not.

24

Q

Did you know the legal consequences or have any

25

idea of what the legal consequences would be of signing that?

190
1

A

I had not ever considered them.

2

Q

When you--did there come a time when your wife

3

admitted that she had, in fact, spoken with an attorney prior

4

to the time of your signing of the deed?

5

A

Yes, she did.

6

Q

And what did she say to you?

7

A

She told me after I had signed this she blurted out

8

that her father, on the advice of her father and an attorney,

9

she was advised to get herself on the deed.

10

Q

Now, earlier your testimony was that, I want to

11

make sure I characterize this correct, but this morning you

12

testified, I believe, that it wasn't necessarily intended as

13

estate planning.

14

A

What did you mean by that?

Well, when Branch asked me about estate planning I

15

assumed he was talking about a life insurance salesman coming

16

to my house and selling me some kind of a plan.

17

Q

So if we were to rephrase the question and state,

18

by deeding the property to your wife, did you intend to

19

provide for her and your children in the event of your death,

20

what would your answer be?

21

A

That was my intent.

22

Q

Now, Mr. Whetman, with respect to your current

23

position, I hand you what has been marked Exhibit 3.

24

the first mortgage balance on your home?

25

A

As of this month it's 162,574.

What is
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THE COURT:

Any redirect?
REDIRECT EXAMINATION

3 I BY MR. THOMAS:
4

Q

Mr. Whetman, coming back to the gift, the nature of

5

the gift that was taken place, at least they're claiming a

6

gift, deed is what I want to refer to.

7
8

MR. BRANCH:

Objection, Your Honor, we have not

made that claim.

9

THE COURT:

I think their position has been that

10

the preparation of the deed, the recording of the deed was

11

part of an agreement entered into during the marriage to join

12

all property

13

used the word gift and I apologize.

14

(inaudible) person.

MR. BRANCH:

I'm probably the one who

And that could be a finding in this

15

Court, but I'm just saying that he's mischaracterizing her

16

testimony, she did not call it a gift.

17

THE COURT:

18

MR. THOMAS:

19
20

It was probably my fault.
That's fine, I'll just simply restate

it.
Q

BY MR. THOMAS:

With respect to the deed that had

21

taken place, after you signed that in June of 1995, did there

22

come a time when marital relations broke down?

23

A

Yes.

24

Q

And when did that take place?

25

A

Well, vocally things that she stated no later than
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November '95, is my recollection.
2 I
3
4

Q

And in November of 1995, what did she state to you

with respect
A

to having to go back

to

work?

She stated many times over and over, and I can

5

quote her, "If I have to go back to work there's no reason to

S

be married."

7
8

And her explanation of that was marriage--

MR. BRANCH:

Objection, relevance, Your Honor.

None of this is relevant to the issues at hand.

9

THE COURT:

10

I'll allow it, go ahead.

THE WITNESS:

She implied that she married me as a

11

means of support, that the only reason to be married is so

12

you don't have to go to work.

13

Q

BY MR. THOMAS:

And between February of 1994 and

14

November of 1995, did she in fact work at all during the

15

marriage?

16

A

No.

17

Q

Did she state anything to you at that time that she

18

was considering a divorce?

19

A

At what time are we talking about?

20

Q

November of 1995.

21

A

Yes.

22

Q

What did she say to you regarding that?

23

A

What I just stated that, "If I have to go to work

24
25

there's no reason to be married."
Q

But did she specifically state, "I'm considering
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1 I filing for divorce," or anything along those lines?
2

A

Yes.

3

Q

And this divorce complaint didn't actually get

4

filed until I believe June of 1996, what took place in those

5

intervening months between November of 1995 and June of 1996?

6

MR. BRANCH:

7

THE COURT:

8

ahead.

9

Q

10
11

Objection, relevance.
And I'll note your objection.

BY MR. THOMAS:

You go

What actually took place during

those months, was it a smooth?
A

It was a very rocky time financially for us.

I was

12

trying to get employment and was dissatisfied with where I

13

was working.

14

of stress, particularly when I asked her to participate in

15

going back to work, and every time I did she would respond

16

with, if she had to work there was no reason to be married,

17

which added to my stress and pressure.

18

telling me that she doesn't love me anymore and that her, in

19

her words, she's closed herself off.

20
21

MR. THOMAS:

THE COURT:

23

25

And then she's also

I have no further questions,

Your

Honor.

22

24

We were strapped financially, it caused a lot

Mr. Branch?
RECROSS EXAMINATION

BY MR. BRANCH:
Q

Was there a period of time, Mr. Whetman, when Mrs.
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1

MRf THOMAS:

2

THE COURT:

3

That's correct.
So to take Cox on its face it doesn't

help you.

4

MR, THOMAS:

5

THE COURT:

I understand-Any of these cases on their face, you

6

don't have a 73 and 68-year-old party here like you did in

7

the Jesperson case.

8
9

MR, THOMAS:

No, Your Honor, but let's take a look

at the equities because those are important.

Is all that

10

we're wanting is to have equity done here.

11

Whetman who comes into this marriage with a home that was

12

built with the insurance proceeds from his former wife's

13

passing, and that was her legacy to Mr. Whetman and her

14

children, that is the amount that they received, okay, that's

15

what they get from their mother in terms of an inheritance,

16

that's it, that's what's there and that goes to Mr. Whetman.

17

So he comes in with that figure, all right?

18

We've got Mr.

Now, I think it's important to look at the duration

19

of the marriage in this case.

We're talking about a time

20

period in February of 1994 and then admittedly they

21

acknowledge she, in fact she's the one who raised the issue,

22

that by October of that year, you know, seven, eight months

23

after the marriage they're having marital problems, okay?

24

This isn't the kind of relationship you think of as having

25

everything going, you know, just fine.
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1

I'd like to point out that initially Mr. Whetman

2

was also contributing things that he had, he had the travel

3

that he took the kids on, he had the tax refunds, he had his

4

checking account, all of that came in as well.

5

important to note that they didn't get together and just say,

6

"All right, we're going to make everything joined together

7

here at once."

8

There's no evidence that they ever got together and said,

9

"All right, we're going to get everything together at the

I think it's

They didn't do that, that never happened.

10

same time and we're going to take care of all of these

11

things."

12

half.

13

She kept the stock in her own name for a year and a

THE COURT:

Well, there is evidence from

14

plaintiff's testimony that their agreement was that they

15

would join assets, forces, and energies to make a good home

16

for six children and a happy marriage for two people.

17

MR. THOMAS:

18

THE COURT:

19

But Mr. Whetman-That's fairly credible evidence to me,

I have to tell you that.

20

MR. THOMAS:

21

THE COURT:

I understand.

I mean it's common, it's not an

22

unnatural thing when two people get together to have that as

23

a common goal.

24
25

MR. THOMAS:

But I think it is an unnatural thing

for someone to say, "All right, you can have in this very
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1

short term relationship one half of this $80,000 that has

2

come from my wife's passing, that is my pre-marital

3

property."

4

take place.

5

well, she was talking about--

That is something that would be very unnatural to
It was interesting to note from her testimony as

6

THE COURT:

Love causes one to do strange things.

7

MR. THOMAS:

But that shouldn't be fair, Your

8

Honor, it should not be equitable to allow her to get this

9

huge windfall because that's all it is.

She coming into this

10

marriage with very few funds and she's going out with just

11

about the same.

12

position of about $98,000 and he's leaving with 70 even under

13

his proposal, okay?

14

into their proposal he leaves with a substantially smaller

15

amount, and that's not fair, it's not just, it's not

16

equitable particularly when he brought all of that in.

17

Suddenly all his children's inheritance basically from their

18

mother is gone, it's vanished.

19

THE COURT:

Now, he comes in and he's got, you know, a

If you are to switch the tables and buy

I hear what you're saying.

Let me tell

20

you what I'm having trouble with.

As I view the evidence my

21

best view is the most logical view, and I understand again,

22

love is strange and it's not always logical, is that the

23

evidence appears to show me that there was an agreement to

24

work together, to join forces.

25

the preparation of the deed was part of that plan.

The signature on the deed,
Part of
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the reason I'm feeling that way is because I've not been
given a good reason by the defendant as to why he signed that
otherwise.

To say someone hounded you would not cause

someone it seems to me reasonably to sign away something he
did not want to sign away.
MR. THOMAS:
to his testimony.

There was more than that with respect

I think he testified that he felt it would
-

—

—

•

—

•

—

be appropriate in case something were to happen to him to
make sure that his children were taken care of.
THE COURT:

Okay, and I think he said his wife and

his children.
MR. BRANCH:

That's right.

MR. THOMAS:

So--

THE COURT:

And if that's the case isn't that

further evidence of an intent to transfer?

His testimony was

his wife and his children in case he died.
MR. THOMAS:

I don't believe so because I think

that that is simply, you know, if you will, almost a form of
a poor man's will, if you will, where he's thinking in the
event something happens to me during the marriage and we' re
doing well then I would want them to have this.

But it

certainly wasn't his intent to convey to her his pre-marital
interest in the property and there is a distinction between
that, and I think it's a critical distinction.
It's also noteworthy, just a couple of real
I
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1

important things on this, Your Honor.

2

THE COURT:

3

MR. THOMAS:

Go ahead.
And that has to do with the statements

4

that were made, that he talked about the fact that she'd gone

5

to an attorney before this.

6

MR- BRANCH:

No, his testimony was after.

7

MR. THOMAS:

No, his testimony was--

8

THE COURT:

9

I'm the ultimate fact finder.

10

MR. THOMAS:

Go ahead and give me your best view.

His testimony was that prior, she told

11

him this afterwards, that she told him that prior to the time

12

that she had had the deed done her father and her attorney

13

had advised her to get the deed in her name.

14

the benefit of legal counsel.

15

was taking place with respect to that and he thought he was

16

simply providing a means for his children to be looked out

17

after if he died, but he wasn't intending to transfer the

18

interest so that she would then get his pre-marital property.

19

And that's a real important distinction.

20

He didn't have

He didn't know exactly what

The equities of this case are so far out of whack

21

where in essence these kid's marital, the home they lived in

22

during the parties, during the parties marriage, but after

23

their mother died, basically their legacy from their mother

24

is suddenly going to be gone and it's going to be given to a

25

person who's come in, the parties were together for a period
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1

of 20 months total before things got really rocky.

2

months into this marriage she was stating such things as, you

3

know, "If I've got to work I might as well, I don't want to

4

be in this marriage.

5

she clearly did not want to work.

She tried to claim, "Oh, I

6

had to sacrifice by not working."

Well, the fact is the

7

evidence before the Court is that she didn't want to work.

8

She liked that lifestyle and when it came time to change she

9

said that "I'm out of here if I'm going to have to work.

10
11
12
13

As of 20

I might as well be out of here."

So

I

might as well not be here."
THE COURT:

Mr. Thomas, let me ask you your

position with regard to the appraisals.
MR. THOMAS:

Well, I think clearly Mr. Johnson's

14

appraisal was the better appraisal for a couple of reasons.

15

Number one, he looked at far more comparables than Mr. Reeder

16

did and he had comparables that focused in a fairly close

17

range, in other words, he was looking for that, you know,

18

that cluster of comparables that would come out, and I

19

believe he called it he mode.

And he was looking for that

20

(inaudible) of comparables and then based on that he used

21

five different comparables.

22

one of the comparables of the home that's on that very

23

street, okay?

24

smaller square footage and he knocked that down by a couple.

25

But he pointed out how that had been on the market for over a

Most significant he even used

And he knocked that down because it's a
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1

year and that in fact that had not been able to sell.

2

THE COURT:

3

MR. THOMAS:

For Sale by Owner?
Correct, For Sale by Owner.

I also

4

think it's important that Mr. Jones, the builder, Mr. Jones

5

indicated he'd been building his homes for a long period of

6

time and he essentially came in and said, "If I had to build

7

that home and sell it today I would sell it for," and then he

8

stated the figures, if the lot was $40,000 I'd sell it for

9

approximately--

10
11

THfi COURT:
to build.

12
13

I think he said it would cost this much

MR. THOMAS:

239 to build, and he said the lot

was--

14

THE COURT:

He gave a lot price.

I don't think he

15

said what he would sell it for, he said what it would cost

16

him to build it.

17

testimony.

18

That's what I understood from his

MR. THOMAS:

I had asked him what he would sell

19

that for.

20

asking right around that was, "What would you sell it for

21

today?"

22

Those are the questions I believe that I was

And he said, "239.7, that would be the sales price."
THE COURT:

Now, if--depending on what I do there

23

is going to be an amount due your client to the plaintiff of

24

somewhere between 25,000 approximately, 23,000, and could be

25

75,000 or 80,000.

They want 70, they want 5,000 attorney's
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1

fees, they want 3,000, there's this 3,000 on a Toyota loss

2

that someone has to pay there.

3

couple of assets.

4

MR. THOMAS:

They want credit I think on a

It's my understanding with respect to

5

the Toyota, just so we're clear on that, it's my

6

understanding that the parties agreed that that would be

7

turned back to Mr. Whetman at the conclusion of these

8

proceedings today and that he would then be responsible for

9

that lease payment.

10
11

THE COURT:

But don't I have to determine who eats

the $3,000 current loss?

12

MR. THOMAS:

13

THE COURT:

Yes.
I'm just adding these different things

14

up and we're between 75 and 80,000 on this end and about

15

23,000 on this end.

How would he pay that?

16

MR. THOMAS:

17

THE COURT:

18

MR. THOMAS:

At 70,000 he can't, Your Honor.
The house would have to be sold?
The house is going to have to be sold.

19

There absolutely no way that he could pay $70,000

20

particularly when, you know, the evidence, we believe the

21

better evidence shows the value of the home at 290, I mean

22

there's absolutely no way that he'd be able to come up with

23

$70,000 to be able to pay her anything.

24

that juncture is the home would have to be sold.

25

that could take place and the kid would have to be uprooted

The only solution at
That's all
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1

from the home that they've been in for about five years.

2

THE COURT:

3

MR. THOMAS:

4

THE COURT:

5

And were it something less than that?
Well, you know, he stated that-You wanted a payment plan over five

years?

6

MR. THOMAS : That's right, and he's gone through--

7

THE COURT:

8

At 10 percent just amortizing that

amount five years at 10 percent?
MR. THOMAS:

9

That's what he's requesting from the

I suppose if he has the ability, he certainly would

10

Court.

11

of the $23,000 figure , he would go out and attempt to

12

refinance the home in order to get the $23,000.
THE COURT:

13

Two mortgages are 183,000, if you add

14

some amount onto that the value is even in the range you

15

suggest you're still going to be around 8 0 percent at worst.
MR. THOMAS:

16
17

he would be willing to do that in an attempt to cash her out.
THE COURT:

18
19

Is his testimony he now makes 3,300 a

month?

20

MR. THOMAS:

21

THE COURT:

22

MR. THOMAS:

23

THE COURT:

24

MR. THOMAS:

25

Correct, so if that's available to him

3,3 00 a month gross.
Gross?
Yeah, gross.
And expenses of about 4,500?
About 45.

that he receives $1,280--

I think he also testified
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and then I'll come back out and enter a decision.
(Proceedings concluded)
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